1. DNS: the first step of almost every connection
The Domain Name System (DNS) translates website names into IP addresses. Almost every connection, including those made by malware, begins with a DNS request. This makes it a useful control point: if an infected device cannot resolve the name of the command-and-control server (the so-called C2, which malware uses to receive instructions and send data), the communication breaks off before it even starts. Blocking upstream is often more effective than acting once the damage is already under way.
DNS is, however, one of the most neglected services. Many networks use the connectivity provider's resolver with no filtering at all, while others let devices use external servers chosen by the user, sometimes without the administrator knowing. The result is that the company cannot see or control a significant part of its traffic, and has no useful records to understand what happens when a device behaves abnormally.
2. How a filtering recursive resolver works
A recursive resolver is the server that queries the chain of DNS servers on behalf of devices and then returns the answer. If it is run by the company or its provider, it can apply lists of blocked domains, organised by category such as phishing or malware, and log requests. The filter acts before the connection is opened, so it also applies to devices working remotely that use the company resolver, provided they are configured to do so.
It is not an antivirus. It does not analyse the content of files and cannot see deeply into encrypted traffic. It is a risk-reduction layer that sits alongside an EDR system (Endpoint Detection and Response, meaning detection and response on devices), updates and backups. Presenting it as a complete solution is a promise that cannot be kept, and anyone who sells it that way should be questioned carefully.
3. DNSSEC, DoH and DoT: different protocols for different problems
DNSSEC, DNS over HTTPS (DoH) and DNS over TLS (DoT) are often cited together, but they answer different questions. The table shows what each one protects and what it does not do, to avoid the most common confusion: thinking that one protocol replaces another. Anyone who confuses these roles risks believing they are protected when they are not. When comparing with your provider, ask which of these tools is active and which resolver devices actually use.
DNSSEC guarantees that the response received is authentic and has not been altered. DoH and DoT protect the confidentiality of the request. For a company, the delicate point is DoH: if browsers use external resolvers, requests leave the network and escape internal filters. The practical choice is to decide explicitly which resolver company devices must use and how to treat personal devices connected to the network. A written policy applied to devices is worth more than a generic block.
| Protocol | What it protects | What it does not do |
|---|---|---|
| DNSSEC | Verifies that the DNS response is authentic and unaltered | Does not encrypt the request or block dangerous domains |
| DNS over HTTPS (DoH) | Encrypts DNS requests using HTTPS | Can bypass filters if browsers use external resolvers |
| DNS over TLS (DoT) | Encrypts DNS requests on a dedicated port | Easier to identify and control on the network than DoH |
| Company DNS filter | Blocks domains known for malware, phishing and botnets | Depends on list quality and actual use of the resolver |
4. Blocklists: sources, updates and false positives
A filter is only as good as its lists. Malicious domains change constantly, because attackers' infrastructure is moved quickly and new domains are often registered for each campaign. A service that updates its sources frequently and documents its categories reduces the risk of falling behind threats, and makes it possible to understand why a domain was blocked.
The opposite risk is false positives: a legitimate domain blocked by mistake can stop a process, for example a business management system, a public administration portal or an electronic signature service. You need a fast channel for reports and an approved exception procedure, otherwise employees will try to get around the filter. Ask your provider how it handles both cases and whether you can consult the logs of blocked requests.
5. Visibility and privacy of DNS logs
DNS logs are valuable: they show which devices try to contact suspicious domains, even when an attack has not yet produced visible effects. For this reason they are a detection tool as well as a blocking one, and it is often from the logs that an infected device emerges before the problem spreads across the network. It is worth linking them to alerts from the EDR system, so that correlation is immediate.
However, these are data about people, because they associate a device with a user and the sites requested. They must be processed for clear purposes, with a defined retention period, with notice given to employees and with restricted access, in line with the GDPR. A good configuration records what security needs without turning into general surveillance of personal activity, and this balance should be documented before the service is activated.
6. Getting started: from inventory to policy
The simplest path starts from what happens on the network today. Before changing resolver, observe which DNS servers devices use and which domains are requested most often. This snapshot makes exceptions and undeclared connections visible, and forms the basis for deciding what to block and what to let through. Without this basis, every block will seem arbitrary to users and every exception will become an urgent request.
DNS filtering is one piece of the puzzle, not a standalone project. If it is integrated with updates, EDR, access management and backups, it helps reduce risk in a verifiable way. Ask your IT provider how it connects the filter to other controls and how it measures the result over time, with simple indicators that can be read without being a specialist. A simple, steady figure, such as the number of blocked requests and approved exceptions, is enough to start.
- Inventory the DNS resolvers in use on servers, workstations, access points and mobile devices.
- Identify browsers or applications that use DoH towards external resolvers.
- Decide which company resolver to use and who manages it.
- Activate the filter on one site or pilot group and check for false positives.
- Define the procedure for exceptions and reports.
- Write the DNS policy and inform employees about how logs are processed.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does a DNS filter replace antivirus?
No. A DNS filter blocks connections to domains known to be dangerous, but it does not analyse downloaded files and cannot stop malware already present on a computer that communicates through other channels. It should be combined with an EDR system (Endpoint Detection and Response, meaning detection and response on devices), a firewall and an updates programme. Each layer covers a different part of the risk.
Why can DoH make the filter ineffective?
Because a browser using DoH can send DNS requests to a public resolver chosen by the user, bypassing the company resolver. The filter no longer sees those requests. You can counter this with policies on managed browsers or by blocking known resolvers, but the solution must be verified across your own device fleet.
Does DNSSEC protect browsing from fake sites?
Partly. DNSSEC protects the integrity of DNS responses, so it makes it harder to redirect a name to a false address. However, it does not verify the good faith of a site and does not replace the HTTPS certificate or the user's judgement. A fraudulent site can have a name that is correctly registered.
Does DNS filtering respect employees' privacy?
It can, if it is handled proportionately. DNS logs are personal data when they can be linked to a user. You need a clear legal basis, a notice, limited retention periods and controlled access to the logs. An assessment with your privacy consultant helps define what to record and what not to.
How long does it take to activate?
It depends on how many sites and networks it must cover and how well documented the network already is. A filter on a single office with standard devices can be switched on fairly quickly; the longest part is usually mapping the resolvers and managing exceptions. Ask your provider for a phased plan.