GUIDE · HEALTHCARE SECTOR

Ransomware in healthcare facilities: prevention and continuity of care

This guide explains how a ransomware attack gets into a healthcare facility, which measures reduce the likelihood that it succeeds, how to prepare procedures for continuing care during a systems outage and which notification obligations may apply. It is above all about deciding what to do before an attack.

Updated october 2026
7 min read
Altovar Technical Editorial Team

1. Why the risk is real for healthcare facilities

Ransomware is a program that encrypts a system's files and demands payment to restore access to them. In healthcare facilities the effect is immediate: appointments stop, records cannot be consulted, reports cannot be released, analyses are blocked. The damage is not limited to data but extends to the capacity to provide care in the hours following the attack. For this reason the issue is one of continuity, not only of cyber security.

These attacks often arrive through ordinary channels: an email with an attachment, poorly protected remote access, an account with a reused password, a system that is not up to date. No specific target is needed, because many campaigns hit anyone with a weakness. Reducing the risk means closing the most common doors and preparing the response before the attack arrives, because during an attack decisions are made under pressure.

2. Prerequisites: who needs to be involved

Prevention involves management, which sets priorities and acceptable downtime; the administrative manager, who knows the processes; the IT supplier, who runs the systems and backups; and clinical staff, who need to know how to work in an emergency. Without everyone involved, technical measures remain disconnected from clinical practice and nobody knows who decides at critical moments.

Before you start, collect the list of systems exposed to the internet, active remote access and suppliers with access to the network. If you do not have it, this is the first activity to complete. A response plan should be written on the basis of what actually exists in the facility, not on a generic template that does not match the real systems. Involve whoever manages external communications too, because during an incident they must be handled carefully and without improvisation.

3. The steps to reduce the risk and prepare the response

The order matters. Interventions on credentials and remote access are the most effective and take little time, so they come first. Emergency procedures require more work and must be written before they are needed, because during an attack nobody reads them. Each step must produce a verifiable document or configuration: a step that is declared but not documented proves nothing. Clinical staff should receive simple, brief instructions with concrete examples from their own ward.

Already at this stage, check with the supplier which systems are exposed and which recovery times are realistic. The answers help you decide where to concentrate interventions, because not all systems carry the same weight for care and for the continuity of daily activities. Write the instructions on a single page, because during an outage nobody reads long documents.

  1. Enable multi-factor authentication for email, remote access and administrative accounts.
  2. Close or protect remote access that is no longer needed, and record who can open new access.
  3. Apply security updates to systems, prioritising those exposed to the internet and those used for care.
  4. Train staff to recognise suspicious messages and report them immediately, without fear of being wrong.
  5. Separate the network of devices and clinical computers from the administrative network, and restrict communications between the two.
  6. Set up separate, non-modifiable backups, as described in the guide on clinical data backups.
  7. Write an isolation procedure: who can disconnect systems, how, and how staff are alerted.
  8. Prepare paper forms or another degraded mode for recording care activities during an outage.
  9. Check with the supplier the recovery times for the most critical systems and note them in the plan.

4. Common mistakes

The first mistake is thinking the problem is purely technical: without a continuity procedure, every outage becomes a decision made under pressure. The second is having an antivirus and considering the matter closed, when the real defence lies in access controls and backups. The third is keeping security copies permanently connected to the working network, where malware reaches them easily.

A fourth mistake is not testing procedures: a plan that has never been exercised tends to fail the first time it is used for real. Finally, many facilities do not know whom to alert or within what timescales. If the facility falls under notification obligations, the deadlines can be very tight and must be checked with an adviser before an incident, not during one. Another trap is assuming that third-party systems are covered by internal protection without verification.

5. How to check that preparation works

Simulate a systems outage at a set time, with only management and the heads of department informed, and check whether staff know where to find the paper procedures, whom to call and how to record activities. Note every point at which the procedure broke down and assign it to a named person with a date. An exercise that produces no written corrections has little value.

Also check that the recovery of the most critical systems takes place within the time management has defined. If it does not, the gap between planned and actual time is the first decision to discuss. Repeat the exercise periodically and after every significant change to systems, staff or suppliers. Also note how long each phase of the simulation took, because real timings are the most useful data.

6. How to get started

This week enable multi-factor authentication on email and administrative accounts, and ask the supplier for the list of active remote access. These are two actions that can be completed quickly and immediately reduce part of the most frequent risks. They should be done straight away, even without a formal project. The rest of the plan can follow calmly once these points are clear.

Then schedule a short meeting with management and the heads of department to decide who can disconnect systems in the event of an attack and what the ward does in the following hours. Decisions taken in advance are worth more than any tool bought in an emergency, and they must be written in a document everyone can find. Ask management to approve the document by the next meeting.

Frequently Asked Questions

Does paying the ransom solve the problem?

Not reliably, and the decision should not be taken in haste. Payment does not guarantee data recovery and can expose you to further legal and operational problems. Choices on this matter should be discussed in advance with the IT supplier and a legal adviser, and included in the response plan. The best way to avoid deciding under pressure is to prepare the response in advance.

Is an antivirus enough to protect the facility?

No. An antivirus can stop some known malware, but it does not replace protected access, updates, network separation and separate backups. Many attacks use stolen credentials or poorly configured remote access, situations an antivirus does not see. Treat antivirus as one part of the defence, not the defence itself.

Who must be alerted when an attack happens?

In addition to internal staff and management, you may need to alert the data protection supervisory authority or the authority responsible for security, if the facility falls under the obligations. The GDPR requires notification within 72 hours of becoming aware of a personal data breach. NIS2 requires an early warning within 24 hours and an incident notification within 72 hours, for entities within its scope. Check with an adviser which apply to you.

How long does it take to return to operations?

It depends on how many systems are involved, the quality of the backups, whether separate copies exist and how well the procedures are prepared. There is no universal time. The useful figure comes from restore tests and exercises: compare it with the maximum downtime management has defined.

Do I need an agreement with the supplier for incident response?

It is useful to set out in writing who does what during an incident: who responds, within what timescales, who is authorised to act on systems, how the status is communicated and who decides on external communications. Without these points, in the first moments of an attack each party waits for the other to act.

About this content

General informational guide. Regulations and technical requirements change over time: always check the official sources and assess your specific case with a qualified technical or legal advisor.

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