GUIDE · ISO 27001 STANDARD

Risk assessment for ISO 27001: a practical method to apply in your company

By the end you will be able to build a simple, repeatable risk assessment for your management system. You will start from the assets within the scope, assess threats and impacts, and decide how to treat each risk. The method is designed for a medium-sized organisation, without specialist software.

Updated october 2026
8 min read
Altovar Technical Editorial Team

1. Why risk assessment is the core of the system

In the information security management system, the risk assessment is the point from which everything else follows. The controls you choose, your investment priorities and the statement of applicability all derive from the risks identified. If the assessment is weak, the controls will appear to have been chosen at random, and the certification body will notice straight away. Even senior management, when presented with a list of risks that lacks logic, struggles to trust the priorities that follow from it.

The method does not need to be sophisticated. The standard requires it to be defined, applied consistently and capable of producing results that can be compared over time. A well-structured spreadsheet, updated regularly and approved by management, is more useful than a complex model nobody can read. What matters is being able to explain why a risk sits at the top of the list.

2. What you need before you start

You need three things. The first is the approved scope, because the assessment covers only what is inside the system. The second is an inventory of assets, meaning the things that have value for the organisation: information, systems, services, equipment, paper documents and critical skills. The third is a group of people who know the processes, with representatives from IT, administration and operations.

Also define the valuation criterion. Typically you look at confidentiality, integrity and availability: can the information be read by someone who should not have access to it, can it be altered without anyone noticing, is it accessible when needed? These three aspects are the foundation of information security and help bring order to the assessments. For each asset, choose the highest value across these three aspects, and note the reason: it will be the basis for all later assessments.

3. The steps of the method

The method should be repeated whenever the scope changes significantly. Follow these steps and document each result. Work in order, because each step builds on the previous one: without an asset inventory the impact assessment stays abstract, and without impacts the risk scale has no meaning. Repeat the cycle at least when sites, services or important suppliers change, and every time an incident reveals a weakness the assessment had not anticipated.

  1. List the assets within the scope and assign each one a responsible owner.
  2. For each asset, assess the impact of a loss of confidentiality, integrity or availability.
  3. Identify plausible threats, such as unauthorised access, human error, failure or cyber attack.
  4. Identify the vulnerabilities that would make the threat possible, for example access rights not revoked or backups never tested.
  5. Estimate the likelihood and impact of each scenario using a simple scale.
  6. Calculate the risk level and sort the list from highest to lowest.
  7. Decide how to treat each risk, that is, reduce it, accept it, avoid it or transfer it, and assign an owner and a deadline.

4. How to assign a risk level

To compare risks you need a shared scale. You do not need precise numbers: a qualitative scale with four levels is enough for most organisations. The level comes from combining likelihood and impact, and should be defined once, so that two different people reach the same result for the same scenario. Agree the criteria with management before you start assessing, because changing them midway makes the results impossible to compare.

The examples in the table are generic and should be adapted to your context. The point is to obtain a scale that management understands and accepts. If a level does not convince you, change its description before applying it, but do not change the scale halfway through the analysis. Record in the method document who approved the scale and on what date. Ask people who know the business to propose an example from their own area.

LevelWhat it meansGeneric example
LowHappens rarely or the impact is containedAn internal document deleted by mistake and recovered from backup
MediumCan happen and causes manageable disruptionA former employee's account still active for a few days
HighPlausible and with significant effects on the businessA billing system down long enough to block sales
CriticalLikely and capable of compromising essential data or activitiesCustomer data taken through a compromised account

5. Common mistakes

The first mistake is starting from threats instead of assets. You end up with a list of well-known attacks that says nothing about the organisation. The second is rating almost everything as high, for fear of underestimating: then the list no longer helps you decide. The third is failing to document acceptance decisions, which become the auditor's first question. Anyone who rates everything as high also paves the way for generic and poorly defensible treatment choices in front of an auditor.

Another mistake is to carry out the analysis once, close to the audit, and then abandon it. Risk changes with new systems, new suppliers, new staff and new incidents. The analysis should be reviewed regularly and every time a change affects the scope. If the document has not been updated after the latest incident, the certification body will notice. A simple way to avoid this is to set a review date in the document itself and link it to the events that should trigger it.

6. How to tell whether the method works

A good method produces decisions, not just lists. Check that every high risk has an assigned treatment and a deadline, that every control applied is linked to a risk, and that every exclusion from the statement of applicability is justified. If you find risks without an owner or controls without a risk, there is a missing link. This check takes a few minutes and almost always reveals where the method stopped halfway.

Another test is to ask management to choose some risks to accept and explain why. If the discussion is concrete and produces a signed decision, the method works. If nobody understands the scale, it should be simplified. In both cases the result is useful, because it shows immediately where the method needs to improve before the next assessment cycle.

7. How to start

This week, take the approved scope, or its draft, and select with the owners the most important assets, for example systems holding customer data and essential services. Do not seek the complete inventory on the first attempt: the aim is an ordered list to assess. Also note who provided each piece of information, because you will need to know where it came from at a later check.

Then apply the scale to the initial list and prepare a first list of high risks to discuss with management. When the method is ready, the guide on the Annex A controls will help you link each risk to possible countermeasures. Do not try to close everything in one meeting: several short meetings, with material prepared in advance, usually produce a more reliable list than one long, confused session.

Frequently Asked Questions

Do we need dedicated software for the risk assessment?

No. Many organisations complete the analysis with structured spreadsheets, shared registers and meeting minutes. A dedicated tool becomes useful when assets, sites and controls grow and you need to track many links. Choose according to what you can maintain regularly: a complex tool left behind is worth less than a simple sheet kept up to date.

Who should take part in the risk assessment?

You need the people who know the processes and those who make the decisions. In practice: an IT or security manager, a representative from administration, someone from operations and management for final approval. The consultant can facilitate the discussion, but the assessments must come from within the organisation, because internal people are the ones who really know the impact.

What is the difference between a threat and a vulnerability?

A threat is something that could cause harm, for example malware, human error or theft of credentials. A vulnerability is the weakness that allows the threat to have an effect, for example a shared password or an unpatched system. Risk arises from the combination of threat, vulnerability and impact on the asset. Keeping them separate avoids confusing problems with their causes.

How often should the risk assessment be updated?

It should be reviewed at regular intervals, set within the management system, and whenever the scope changes significantly: new services, new suppliers, new sites, relevant incidents or regulatory and contractual changes. Record the review even when nothing has changed, because it shows that the check was carried out.

Can a risk simply be accepted?

Yes, but acceptance must be a formal decision by management, justified in writing and reviewed periodically. It is not a way to ignore a problem. Accepting a high risk without a concrete reason is one of the most frequent audit findings. If the risk exceeds the threshold the organisation considers unacceptable, it must be treated.

About this content

General informational guide. Regulations and technical requirements change over time: always check the official sources and assess your specific case with a qualified technical or legal advisor.

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