GUIDE · ENDPOINTS AND EMAIL

Fake supplier and diverted payment fraud: prevention procedures

After reading this guide you will be able to recognise how fake supplier and diverted payment fraud works, build a verification procedure before every change to payment details and define who approves what. You will also see how to test that the rules hold under pressure, rather than relying only on the vigilance of whoever makes the transfer.

Updated october 2026
8 min read
Altovar Technical Editorial Team

1. How the fraud works

In this type of fraud, a malicious actor poses as a regular supplier, or compromises the mailbox of a genuine supplier, and announces a change of bank details for future payments. The message looks normal, often slots into an existing conversation and asks you to update the supplier record before the next invoice. The next transfer ends up in an account controlled by the fraudster, and the money leaves in a few steps.

The mechanism works because it exploits trust and habit. Whoever makes the payment is following a routine procedure, and the request arrives at the right moment. In many cases the damage is discovered late, when the genuine supplier chases the balance. For this reason, prevention must be built into the process, not into the ability to spot a suspicious message at a glance.

2. Prerequisites: who approves what

Before writing the procedure you need to know who does what. Whoever enters supplier data, whoever authorises payments, whoever executes the transfer and whoever reconciles the accounts should be different people, where the structure allows. Where staff are limited, the separation may be only partial, but it must be offset by independent verification of changes, entrusted to a person who did not receive the request.

You also need an up-to-date supplier master file, with bank details recorded and the date of the last check. Without this reference data nobody can say whether a change is genuine. Suppliers too must know that a change of bank account follows a formal channel and is not accepted by email alone, whatever the tone of the message. Even an urgent and courteous message must be handled under the same rule.

3. Verification procedure before payment

The procedure must be short and applicable to every payment, not just to suspicious cases. The most important point is the confirmation call, made to a number already held on the supplier master file. If the number in the message belongs to the fraudster, the verification becomes a confirmation of the fraud: for this reason the contact details given in the message must never be used, not even if they appear to belong to the supplier.

  1. No change of bank details is accepted by email alone.
  2. The change is confirmed by a phone call to a number already on the supplier master file, not to the number given in the message.
  3. The request is recorded with date, reason and the name of the person who verified it.
  4. Two different people approve the new account before the first payment.
  5. For payments above an internal threshold, the verification is repeated against the original invoice.
  6. The payment is made only after a recorded approval, with no undocumented urgent exceptions.

4. Signs that a payment needs checking

These signs do not prove fraud, but they call for the verification the procedure requires. The most common error is to assume the sign will be obvious. Often the message is impeccably written and the tone is friendly. The check must be carried out even when nothing seems odd, because the risk lies in the process and not in the impression made on the recipient. The check is a rule, not a judgement.

Time pressure is a typical tool of fraudsters. A request to pay by today, with no possibility of verification, is one more reason to stop. The rule that does not give in to urgency is the most useful, because it protects precisely in those moments when the system seems most under pressure. Whoever makes the payment must be able to say no without having to justify themselves.

  • A regular supplier asks for a change of account with an urgent message
  • The request arrives close to a major payment or deadline
  • The message contains a different invoice or a link instead of the usual attachment
  • The tone changes, or the sender asks you not to involve other colleagues

5. Common mistakes

The first mistake is verifying the change by replying to the same email. If the fraudster controls the mailbox, the reply comes from them. The second is relying on the vigilance of whoever makes the payment alone, without a second approval. The third is having urgent exceptions that leave no trace, because those are precisely what fraud exploits most effectively. They must therefore be limited and always documented.

Another mistake is thinking the problem concerns only email. An attachment with a false invoice, a copied payment portal or a convincing phone call can all lead to the same outcome. For this reason the procedure must be designed around the payment, not just around the channel through which the request arrives. It is worth seeking help from someone who knows the payment flows to identify the weakest points along the way.

6. How to verify the procedure works

A procedure that nobody tests is not a defence. You can simulate a change of bank details in a controlled way, checking whether the rule is applied, who responds and how long it takes. The test quickly reveals whether the confirmation call is actually made, or whether verification reduces to an email reply. Document the result and discuss it with those involved in payments.

Also review the exceptions: how many have been approved, for what reason and by whom. A growing number of urgent exceptions is a warning sign about the process, not about individuals. If the organisation is subject to IT risk management obligations, such as those set by the NIS2 Directive or, for certain financial entities, the DORA regulation, check with a consultant how to document this evidence.

7. What to do if it has already happened

If a payment has been made to the wrong account, time is critical. Contact your bank immediately to request a block or recovery, inform the genuine supplier and keep all the material: messages, attachments, supplier master file and payment records. Do not delete anything to tidy up, because every trace erased may be needed by those investigating and by those who must reconstruct the facts.

Then assess whether the incident triggers notification obligations, for example towards the competent authorities or towards data subjects, if personal data is involved. Ask a legal adviser to support you in the assessment. Finally, use the incident to review the procedure, without looking for an individual culprit, because the problem is usually in the process. A supplier or consultant can help you do this without assigning blame.

8. How to start

This week, select a few regular suppliers and check that their bank details are recorded on the supplier master file with a verification date. For each, ask how the last change was verified. This check is quick and immediately reveals where the procedure is missing, without requiring special tools or changes to systems. A shared spreadsheet, a few phone calls and some patience with the replies are enough.

Then write the rule for confirmation by phone on an already known number, make it mandatory for every change and apply it before the next payment. Only after that extend the separation of approvals. The wider picture of device and email security, which feeds these risks, is covered in the endpoint guide. It is worth reading before you define the approvals, because the entry points are the same.

Frequently Asked Questions

Is an email check enough to confirm a change of account?

No. A reply to a suspicious message goes to the same mailbox that may be compromised, so it proves nothing. Confirmation must take place through a different channel, such as a phone call to a number already on the supplier master file, or through a formal contact from the supplier. The contact details given in the message must never be used for verification, because they may belong to the fraudster.

Which technical controls help?

Some email security controls, such as sender domain authentication, reduce email spoofing. Multi-factor authentication on email accounts also limits the risk of compromise. However, no technical control replaces the verification procedure for payment changes, because the message may come from a genuine but compromised mailbox.

Who is liable if the payment goes through as a result of the fraud?

It depends on the contract, the bank's rules and how the request was handled. A documented and followed procedure is strong evidence of due diligence. Liability should be clarified with a legal adviser, and the bank must be informed immediately. Do not assume that reimbursement is automatic.

Can my IT service provider help with this?

It can help with the technical side: email security, account authentication, access logging and monitoring of suspicious mailbox rules. It cannot, however, replace the process rules, which are the responsibility of the organisation. Ask your provider what it covers and what remains your responsibility, and put this division in writing.

How do I handle a supplier who will not accept verification?

Verification is a security practice, not a judgement on the supplier. Explain it clearly and courteously: the rule applies to all suppliers and protects both parties. A serious supplier understands and cooperates. Anyone who insists on avoiding verification should be assessed carefully, because that very behaviour is typical of fraud.

About this content

General informational guide. Regulations and technical requirements change over time: always check the official sources and assess your specific case with a qualified technical or legal advisor.

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