1. Why paying a ransom is a complex decision
When ransomware encrypts data, the temptation to pay is strong: the ransom seems the quickest route back to operations. But paying does not guarantee recovery. Some groups do not provide the key, others provide a partial one, and stolen data can still be resold or published. Payment should therefore be seen as a choice with legal, financial and operational risks, not as a technical act to be closed in a hurry.
Before discussing payment, the company should already have the operational answers: which systems are affected, which backup copies are intact and how long it would take to restart without paying. A company that reaches the moment of the ransom without verified backups is in a weak position, and tends to make decisions under pressure, precisely when it has the least information available.
2. The legal framework: sanctions, anti-money laundering and notifications
The most delicate legal point is the possibility that a payment ends up, directly or indirectly, with sanctioned parties or criminal groups. In such cases the international and EU sanctions rules may apply, with consequences also for those who arrange the payment and for those who act as intermediaries. The framework is not uniform across countries and changes over time: an up-to-date legal opinion is needed before any decision, documented in writing.
There are also reporting obligations. For organisations within NIS2, or that process personal data, an incident can trigger notifications to the competent authorities. Under the GDPR, notification to the Garante (the Italian data protection authority) is required within 72 hours of becoming aware of the breach, where the conditions apply. Paying a ransom does not replace these requirements: it often makes them more urgent, because the deadlines keep running while you negotiate with attackers.
3. Cyber insurance: what it covers and what it requires
Cyber risk policies can cover response costs, recovery, business interruption and, in some cases, sums linked to the ransom. However, conditions vary widely, and many policies make compensation conditional on compliance with security requirements declared before the incident, such as multi-factor authentication and separate backups. Reading the contract before an event is more useful than discovering its limits afterwards, when the insurer assesses the claim.
Declaring controls that are not actually active is one of the most serious risks, because it can void the cover precisely when you need it. Ask for the policy to be reviewed together with your consultant and IT provider, so that the declared requirements match the reality of your systems. A cross-check before signing is much cheaper than a dispute after an attack.
| Item | Question to ask | Why it matters |
|---|---|---|
| Security requirements | Which controls must I have active, for example authentication and backups? | A gap can reduce or exclude compensation |
| Ransom payment | Does the policy cover sums demanded by attackers, and under what conditions? | Conditions vary and depend on the legal framework |
| Incident notification | Within what time must I inform the insurer, and who supports me? | Delays can jeopardise the cover |
| Recovery costs | Are system rebuilding and technical consultancy covered? | These are often the heaviest item |
| Exclusions | Which events or systems are excluded? | Avoids surprises when making a claim |
4. Backup and recovery: the real defence
The most effective defence remains the ability to restore without paying. Immutable or network-isolated backups, offline copies or copies on a separate system, and periodic restore tests are the core of the strategy. The 3-2-1 rule (three copies, on two different media, one off site) is a useful reference, but it must be verified with real tests and not only on paper, because a copy that nobody has ever restored is not a reliable copy.
A backup that sits on the same network as the file server is a target: many attacks look precisely for accessible copies before encrypting data. Separate backup credentials from everyday ones, restrict access and check the logs of deletions. A restore test on a test system tells you more than any reassurance, because it shows the real time required and the problems no one had foreseen.
5. Handling an incident in progress
In the first hours the priority is containment. Isolating the affected systems, preserving evidence and calling those who can lead the response are actions to take in that order. Switching everything off in a panic can destroy information useful for understanding how access happened and for any reports. An incident response team exists precisely to co-ordinate these steps, so that everyone does not act on their own.
Deciding whether to consider a payment requires a process: who decides, with which legal advice, with which documentation. Defining it beforehand, in a response plan, avoids choices made under pressure. The national authorities responsible for cybersecurity can offer guidance and support; check your country's official channels before you need them, so you do not have to look for them during the emergency. A printed contact list is worth more than a website consulted while the network is down.
6. Getting started: preparing the response before an attack
The best time to decide on a possible ransom is before it happens. You need a written plan, known to those who will apply it and tested through periodic exercises. The plan does not need to be long: it must say who decides, who calls whom, and where the backups and essential documentation are held. Update it every time suppliers, staff or critical systems change, because an old plan is almost useless.
A concrete first step is to ask your IT provider and insurance broker for a joint review of backups and policy. The two should be read together, because the policy assumes controls that must really exist. If you find a gap between what you have declared and what is active, correct it before it becomes a problem during a claim. The result is a policy that really covers what you declared.
- Map critical systems and define an acceptable downtime for each.
- Verify that immutable or isolated backups exist and carry out a real restore test.
- Review the cyber policy: requirements, notification deadlines and exclusions.
- Appoint someone responsible for the payment decision and a designated legal adviser.
- Collect emergency contacts for your IT provider, legal adviser and insurer, including in printed form.
- Rehearse at least once with a tabletop exercise, meaning a desk-based simulation of the incident.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is paying a ransom illegal?
Not automatically everywhere, but the position can become risky if the payment reaches sanctioned parties or groups linked to criminal organisations. The rules are national and evolving, so the answer must be checked case by case with a lawyer before any decision. Do not rely on a generic answer found online.
Does a cyber policy always cover the ransom?
No. Some policies include sums linked to the ransom, others do not, and conditions vary widely. Even where cover exists, it usually depends on meeting security requirements and notification deadlines. Read the exclusions and ask how a concrete event would be handled, including the steps the insurer requires.
If I have backups, can I skip reporting the incident?
It depends on the obligations that apply to you. Restoring solves the operational problem, but it does not cancel any duty to notify authorities or data subjects, for example where personal data is involved. Data theft can occur even without visible encryption. Assess the incident with a lawyer.
Where can I get help straight after an attack?
Your first contact is the IT provider or the response team you identified in your plan. You can also approach the national authorities responsible for cybersecurity, which provide guidance, and your insurer if you hold a policy. Keep the contact list in printed form too, because the network may be unavailable during an attack.
Is a backup enough to protect yourself?
Backup is the most important defence, but it is not sufficient on its own. It must be isolated from the network, tested and documented, and your organisation must know how to use it. Even with intact backups, questions remain about notification, data theft and reputation with customers and partners.